Mechanism Design with Collusive Auditing: A Three-Tier Agency Model with “Monotone Comparative Statics” and an Implication for Corporate Governance

Yutaka Suzuki

Faculty of Economics, Hosei University
4342 Aihara, Machida-City, Tokyo 194-0298, Japan
E-Mail: yutaka@hosei.ac.jp

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ABSTRACT
We build a theoretical model to examine how supervision (auditing) can be utilized to enhance the efficiency of corporate governance and how collusive supervision (auditing) can be deterred. We introduce the outcomes of “Monotone Comparative Statics” ala Topkis (1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)'s generalized envelope theorem, and construct a three-tier agency model with a mathematically tractable structure. This should be an advantage in modeling in comparison with the collusion literature e.g., Kofman and Lawarree (1993)'s auditing application of the three-tier agency model ala Tirole (1986, 1992). The basic trade-off involved in adding the auditor (supervisor) into the hierarchy is the benefit from the discrete reduction in information rent and the improvement of marginal incentives (outputs) versus the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor), and this bottom line is consistently preserved through the extension and generalization of the model. In addition to the theoretical (mainly technical) investigation, the paper also derives some clear and robust implication applicable to corporate governance reform.

Key words: Mechanism Design, Collusion, Supervision, Monotone Comparative Statics, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: D82

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1. Introduction

Recently, auditing has rapidly been increasing in importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S. and Western countries, to meet the needs of corporate governance. Corporate scandals such as those that rocked Yamaichi Securities, Daiwa Bank, Snow Brand Milk Products, and Kanebo in Japan and Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. are examples of firms that failed to build up the effective corporate governance, and collusive supervision (auditing) and revelation of false information was a common occurrence. Auditors (supervisors) usually have greater access to accurate information on the agents, but are subject to collusive pressure (the collusive offer) from the auditees (agents). The means by which adequate supervision (auditing) is used to enhance the efficiency of corporate governance and by which collusive supervision (auditing) can be deterred are important parts of corporate governance reform.

In a typical framework of top management organization of Japanese firms, a shareholders’ meeting elects a director (or the Board of Directors) and an auditor who audits the execution of the management work and makes a report at the shareholders’ meeting. With this auditing system, which has been legally amended several times, it is often said that the auditor has access to a great deal of information inside the firm, including the ability of top managers to perform their jobs, while on the other hand it is doubtful that the auditor can objectively supervise the management while maintaining his independence. Indeed, there is a notion that collusive auditing often exists where an auditor and a manager collude to manipulate information. Thus, corporations should optimally utilize the auditing information in order to increase the shareholders’ interests, with the arrangement that auditor and manager do not collude. Many Japanese firms, such as Toyota and Cannon, do preserve and try to improve this traditional Japanese auditing system. Our paper can be viewed as an analysis of this top management organization in a hidden information setting.

Literature exists that deals with the issues associated with corporate governance and auditing in a three-tier agency model with collusion, developed by Tirole (1986, 1992) and Laffont and Tirole (1991), Laffont and Martimort (1997) etc. In particular, Kofman and Lawarree (1993) applied a three-tier agency model—consisting of the two-type (productivity) agent, the internal and external auditors (supervisors), and the principal—to the issue of auditing and collusion. However, this is a rather complicated model whose structure involves a Kuhn-Tucker problem with many IC (Incentive Compatibility) and IR (Individual Rationality) constraints, and is not a simple mathematical model. This mathematical complexity of this model is a disadvantage.

So, we start with an extremely simple three-tier collusion model, which is a natural extension of the familiar screening (self selection) models, and then generalize its investigation to a continuum of

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1 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)’s recent textbook presents a simple version of the collusion models (Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993)).
types version. Then we introduce here the outcomes of “Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis (1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002) into the analysis of corporate governance in a three-tier agency model. Our paper provides a framework that can address the issues treated in the existing literature in a much simpler fashion, and is indeed beneficial in that we can obtain clearer and more robust implications for corporate governance reform of top management organization.

The basic tradeoff in our model is the benefit from the reduction in information rent by adding the auditor (supervisor) versus the resource cost of adding him into the hierarchy, and this bottom line is preserved through the extension and generalization of the model. The optimal collusion-proof contract in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent three-tier regime has the property whereby (1) Efficiency at the top (the highest type) and (2) Downward distortion for all other types, and the downward distortion is mitigated at the optimum, in comparison with the Principal-Agent two-tier regime. Whether the principal indeed has an incentive to introduce a supervisor---that is, selects a three-tier hierarchy---depends on the balance between the net benefits from both the improvement of marginal incentives (outputs) and the reduction in information rent and the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor). We obtained this result by constructing a three-tier model with a mathematically more tractable structure, which exploited the outcome of “Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis (1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)’s generalized envelope theorem.

2. Motivational Example: Solution with Two Types:

2.1 Principal-Agent Hidden Information Setting

We consider two players: a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal owns the firm and hires the manager (agent) to run it. Profits are $X = \theta + e$, where $\theta$ is the manager’s ability to run the firm and $e$ is the effort he supplies. $\theta$ a priori belongs to $\{\theta, \bar{\theta}\}$ and the prior beliefs are $\Pr(\theta = \bar{\theta}) = h$. Expending effort $e$ costs the manager $C(e)$ in disutility, which satisfies $C(e) > 0$, $C'(e) > 0$, $C'' > 0$, $\forall e \in \mathbb{R}_+$. $W$ is the wage payment the agent receives, and then his utility is $W - C(e)$. We normalize the agent’s reservation utility as 0. The timing of the game is as follows. Prior to contracting, $\theta$ is determined randomly by nature and is known only to the manager (agent). The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it compensation offer to the manager. The
form of the contract is \( \{X, W\} \). \( X \) is the level of profits the manager is required to obtain in the first period and \( W \) the wage he will be paid if he generates the required level. If he produces less than \( X \), the agent receives no pay. If he generates more than \( X \), he will still receive only \( W \). If the manager rejects the offer, the game ends. If he accepts the offer, a contract is signed and the principal is fully committed. This is a standard screening problem. We specify \( \{\theta, \tilde{\theta}\} = \{0, 1\} \),

\[
C(e) = \frac{e^2}{4} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr(\theta = \tilde{\theta} = 1) = h = 1/2 .
\]

Now, we examine the optimal solution. Let \( X(1) \) and \( X(0) \) be the profits specified for the good type \( (\theta = 1) \) and the bad type \( (\theta = 0) \) respectively. We write \( X_1 \) and \( X_0 \) for \( X(1) \) and \( X(0) \), respectively. Define \( W(1) \) and \( W(0) \) similarly: These are the wages specified by the contracts.

The benchmark first best solution maximizes the expected profits, subject to the IR (Individual Rationality) constraints, which require that the manager be willing to sign a contract whatever her type. That is,

\[
\max_{\{X_1, W_1\},\{X_0, W_0\}} \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_1 - W_1 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_0 - W_0 \right]
\]

s.t. 
\[
W_1 - C(X_1 - 1) \geq 0
\]
\[
W_0 - C(X_0) \geq 0
\]

Substituting \( W_1 = C(X_1 - 1) = (X_1 - 1)^2/4 \) and \( W_0 = C(X_0) = X_0^2/4 \) into the objective function results in the expected total surplus maximization:

\[
\max_{\{X_1, W_1\},\{X_0, W_0\}} \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_1 - \left( X_1 - 1 \right)^2/4 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_0 - X_0^2/4 \right]
\]

The first order conditions for the optimum are:

\[
1 - (X_1 - 1)/2 = 0 \Leftrightarrow X_1^{FB} = 3
\]
\[
1 - X_0/2 = 0 \Leftrightarrow X_0^{FB} = 2
\]

We easily find that \( W_1^{FB} = W_2^{FB} = 1 \).

Next, under the assumption of asymmetric information on \( \theta \), we seek the separating contracts, which induce the two types to behave differently. For this, the contracts must be incentive
compatible.

IC (Incentive Compatibility) requires:

\[ W_i - C(X_i - \theta) \geq W_0 - C(X_0 - \theta) \Leftrightarrow W_i - (X_i - 1)^2/4 \geq W_0 - (X_0 - 1)^2/4 \]  

\[ W_0 - C(X_0 - \theta) \geq W_i - C(X_i - \theta) \Leftrightarrow W_0 - X_0^2/4 \geq W_i - X_i^2/4 \]

(1a) states that the good type \((\theta = 1)\) prefers to select the contract intended for him rather than select the contract intended for the bad type \((\theta = 0)\), that is, the good type’s IC constraint. (1b) states that the bad type \((\theta = 0)\) prefers to select the contract intended for him rather than select the contract intended for the good type \((\theta = 1)\), that is, the bad type’s IC.

The IR (Individual Rationality) constraints require:

\[ W_i - C(X_i - \theta) = W_i - (X_i - 1)^2/4 \geq 0 \]  

\[ W_0 - C(X_0 - \theta) = W_0 - X_0^2/4 \geq 0 \]

The first best solution \(\{X_1^{FB}, X_2^{FB}\} = \{3, 2\}, \{W_1^{FB}, W_2^{FB}\} = \{1, 1\}\) is not incentive compatible for the good type, since he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend type \(\theta = 0\)). Indeed, we can check the incentive of the good type \(\theta = 1\).

If he tells the truth "\(\theta = 1\)" : he obtains \(1 - (3 - 1)^2/4 = 0\).

If he says "\(\theta = 0\)" (i.e., lie), he obtains \(1 - (2 - 1)^2/4 = 3/4\)

Hence, he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend), i.e., not incentive compatible.

As is typical in such problems, only the good type’s IC (1a) and the bad type’s IR (2b) bind at the optimum. From (2b), \(W_0 = X_0^2/4\). Substituting it into (1a) with equality, we have

\[ W_i - (X_i - 1)^2/4 = W_0 - (X_0 - 1)^2/4 = X_0^2/4 - (X_0 - 1)^2/4 = (2X_0 - 1)/4 \]  

This is the information rent for the good type. Hence, the optimization problem can be written as follows
\[
\max \frac{1}{2} [X_1 - W_i] + \frac{1}{2} [X_0 - W_0] \\
\text{s.t. } W_i - (X_1 - 1)^2/4 = (2X_0 - 1)/4 \\
W_0 = X_0^2/2
\]

Substitute \( W_0 = X_0^2/2 \) and \( W_i = (X_1 - 1)^2/4 + (2X_0 - 1)/4 \) into the objective function.

\[
\max_{X_1, X_0} \frac{1}{2} [X_1 - (X_1 - 1)^2/4] + \frac{1}{2} [X_0 - X_0^2/2] - \frac{1}{2} \frac{(2X_0 - 1)}{4}
\]

The first order conditions for the optimum are:

\[
1 - (X_1 - 1)/2 = 0 \iff X_1^* = 3 = X_1^{FB}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{2} X_0 - 1/2 = 0 \iff X_0^* = 1 < X_0^{FB} = 2
\]

The result is quite a standard one. (1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) \( X_1^* = X_1^{FB} \) and

(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (the bad type) \( X_0^* < X_0^{FB} \). The intuition for the result is that a small reduction in \( X_0 \) from the first best level \( X_0^{FB} \) results in a second-order (marginal) reduction in total surplus for the bad type, but generates a first-order (discrete) reduction in the good type’s information rent, through relaxing the IC for the good type and allowing the principal to reduce \( W \) discretely.

2.2 Collusion and Supervision

Now, we introduce a third player, called the “supervisor”, into the model. The principal has access, at a cost \( z \), to the supervisor who is an internal auditor and can, for each \( \Theta \), provide proof of the fact \( \Theta \) with probability \( p = 1/2 \), and with \( 1 - p = 1/2 \), is unable to obtain any information. We assume that proofs of \( \Theta \) cannot be falsified, and thus the agent is protected against false claims that his type \( \Theta \) is higher/lower than what it really is. On the other hand, the agent can potentially benefit from a failure by the supervisor to truthfully report that his type is \( \Theta = 1 \), when the supervisor observes the signal \( \Theta \). A self-interested supervisor will collude with the agent only if he benefits from such behavior. Specifically, let us assume the following collusion technology: if the
agent offers the supervisor a transfer (side payment) $t$, he benefits up to $kt$, where $k \in [0,1]$. The idea is that transfers of this sort, being prevented by the principal, may be hard to organize and subject to resource losses. We follow the literature in assuming that side-contracts of this sort are possible (See, e.g., Tirole 1992).

To avoid collusion, the principal will have to offer the supervisor a reward $W_s$ for providing $\theta = 1$, such that the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.

$$W_s \geq kU_1 = k\left[C(X_0) - C(X_0 - 1)\right] = \frac{k}{4}(2X_0 - 1)$$

Indeed, once the information $\theta = 1$ is obtained, the principal will drop the Agent $\theta = 1$’s payment $W_i$ to $C(X_i - 1)$, and not pay the information rent to the agent $\theta = 1$. The agent is thus ready to pay the supervisor an amount of $U_i = (2X_0 - 1)/4$, and the value of this side payment to the supervisor is $kU_1$, where $k \in [0,1]$. Therefore, hiring a supervisor and eliciting his information requires the principal to pay $kU_1$ to the supervisor if the (hard) information of $\theta = 1$ is provided.

The virtual surplus for the good type $\theta = 1$ in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is,

$$\frac{1}{2}X_i - \frac{(X_i - 1)^2}{4} - \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{2}(2X_0 - 1)\right] + \frac{k}{2}(2X_0 - 1)$$

Hence, the expected total virtual surplus is:

$$\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{2}(2X_0 - 1)\right] + \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{2}(2X_0 - 1)\right] - \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{2}(2X_0 - 1)\right] + \frac{k}{2}(2X_0 - 1)$$

The first order conditions for the optimum are:

$$1 - (X_i - 1)/2 = 0 \iff X_i^S = 3 = X_i^{FB}$$
Proposition 1:

In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the optimal collusion-proof contract has the following properties that

1. **Efficiency at the top** (the good type) \( X^S_1 = X^{FB}_1 = 3 \)
2. **Downward distortion at the bottom** (the bad type) is mitigated, that is,
   \[
   X^*_0 = 1 \leq X^S_0 = 2 - \frac{1+k}{2} < X^{FB}_0 = 2 .
   \]

The result (2) comes from the reduction in total and marginal information rents by the introduction of a supervisor with \( k \leq 1 \). This is at least efficiency improving.

Last, we will check the condition under which the principal has an incentive to introduce a supervisor into the organization.

The principal’s payoff with no supervisor is, by substituting \( X^*_1 = 3, X^*_0 = 1 \),

\[
\Pi^S = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 3 - \left( 3 - 1 \right)^2 / 4 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - 1 / 4 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left( 2 - 1 \right) / 4 = 1 + \frac{3}{8} - \frac{1}{8} = 1 + \frac{1}{4}
\]

The principal’s payoff with supervisor is, by substituting \( X^S_1 = 3, X^S_0 = 2 - \frac{1+k}{2} \),

\[
\Pi^S = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 3 - \left( 3 - 1 \right)^2 / 4 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{3-k}{2} \right] - \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{3-k}{2} \right)^2 \]

\[
- \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{3-k}{2} / 2 - 1 \right) + \frac{k}{2} \left( \frac{3-k}{2} / 2 - 1 \right) \right] - \frac{z}{2^{h-1/2}}
\]

Set up cost for the supervisor
\[
\text{Expected Total Surplus} = 1 + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \left( \frac{3-k}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{3-k}{2} \right)^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{(3-k)-1}{4} \right) + \frac{k}{2} \left( \frac{(3-k)-1}{4} \right) \right] - z
\]

Comparing \( \Pi^{NS}_p \) and \( \Pi^S_p \), we have the condition under which the principal has an incentive to introduce a supervisor, that is, a three-tier hierarchy:

\[
\frac{1}{4} \leq \frac{1}{2} \left[ \left( \frac{3-k}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{3-k}{2} \right)^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1+k(2-k)}{4} \right) \right] - z
\]

\[
\iff z \leq \frac{1}{32} (k-1)(k-3) \quad \text{------(*)}
\]

We present a figure, which represents the region \((k, z)\) satisfying this condition.

\((*)\) and \(0 \leq k \leq 1\) correspond to the cross-hatched area in the figure below.
We can read this figure as follows. As \( k \to 0 \), the benefit due to the reduction in the information rent by the introduction of a supervisor is greater. So, even if \( z \) (set up cost) is greater (\( z \to 3/32 \)), the principal has an incentive to hire a supervisor. On the other hand, as \( k \to 1 \), since the benefit due to the reduction in the information rent by the introduction of the supervisor is smaller, only when \( z \) is small enough, hiring supervisor is better than not hiring him. However, collusion indeed reduces the benefit from supervision, which is reflected by the greater downward distortions.

### 3.3 Another specification

We present another specification of the setting and its result. Profits are multiplicative \( X = \theta e \), where \( \theta \) is the manager’s ability with \( \{\theta, \bar{\theta}\} = \{1, 2\} \) and \( e \) is the effort he supplies. Cost function is \( C(e) = e^2 \). \( W \) is the wage payment, and the manager’s utility is \( W - C(e) = W - e^2 \).

The timing of the game is the same as before. The form of the contract is \( \{X, W\} \). \( X \) is the level of profits the manager is required to obtain and \( W \) the wage he will be paid if he generates the required level.

Let \( X_2 \) and \( X_1 \) be the profits specified for the good type (\( \theta = 2 \)) and the bad type (\( \theta = 1 \)), respectively. Define \( W_2 \) and \( W_1 \) similarly. The point is that in order for type \( \theta \) to attain \( X \), he must supply the amount of effort \( e = X/\theta \).

**IC (Incentive Compatibility)** requires:

\[
W_2 - C(X_2/2) \geq W_1 - C(X_1/2) \iff W_2 - (X_2/2)^2 \geq W_1 - (X_1/2)^2
\]

\[
W_1 - C(X_1) \geq W_2 - C(X_2) \iff W_1 - X_1^2 \geq W_2 - X_2^2
\]

**The IR (Individual Rationality) constraints** require:

\[
W_2 - C(X_2/2) = W_2 - (X_2/2)^2 \geq 0
\]

\[
W_1 - C(X_1) = W_1 - X_1^2 \geq 0
\]

As is typical in such problems, only the good type’s IC and the bad type’s IR bind at the optimum.

Substituting \( W_1 = X_1^2 \) into \( W_2 - (X_2/2)^2 = W_1 - (X_1/2)^2 \) with equality, we have \( W_2 - (X_2/2)^2 = W_1 - (X_1/2)^2 = X_1^2 - (X_1/2)^2 = 3X_1^2/4 \). This is the **information rent** for the
good type. Eventually, we solve the following problem:

$$\max_{X_1, X_2} \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_2 - \left( \frac{X_2}{2} \right)^2 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_1 - X_1^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{3}{4} X_1^2$$

Expected Total Surplus

"Information Rent" for the good type

The first order conditions for the optimum are:

$$1 - X_2/2 = 0 \iff X_2^* = 2 = X_1^{FB}$$

$$1 - 2X_1^* - \frac{3X_1^2}{2} = 0 \iff X_1^* = 2/7 < X_1^{FB} = 1/2$$

The results show (1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) $X_2^* = X_2^{FB}$ and (2) Downward distortion at the bottom (the bad type) $X_1^* < X_1^{FB}$.

Now, we introduce a supervisor into the model. In order to induce the information truthfully from the supervisor, the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint should be satisfied.

$$W_s \geq k \cdot \frac{3X_1^2/4}{\text{Information Rent for the good type}}$$

At the optimum, $W_s = k \cdot 3X_1^2/4$ holds. Substituting it into the Principal’s objective function, her program to design the optimal collusion-proof contract will result in:

$$\max_{X_1, X_2} \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_2 - \left( \frac{X_2}{2} \right)^2 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ X_1 - X_1^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{3}{4} X_1^2 & \frac{k}{4} X_1^2 \\ \text{Information Rent for the good type} & \text{Information Rent for the supervisor} \end{bmatrix} - z$$

The first order conditions for the optimum are:

$$1 - X_2/2 = 0 \iff X_2^S = 2 = X_1^{FB}$$

$$1 - 2X_1^S - \frac{3X_1}{4} + \frac{3kX_1}{4} = 0 \iff X_1^S = \frac{4}{11 + 3k} < X_1^{FB} = \frac{1}{2}$$
Proposition 2:
In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the optimal collusion-proof contract has the property that

1. **Efficiency at the top** (the good type) \( \bar{X}_2^S = X_{FB}^S = 2 \)

2. **Downward distortion at the bottom** (the bad type) is mitigated, that is,

\[
X_1^* = \frac{2}{7} \leq X_1^S = \frac{4}{11+3k} < X_{FB}^S = \frac{1}{2}
\]

Equality holds at \( k=1 \).

Last, we check the condition under which the principal has an incentive to bring a supervisor into the organization.

The principal’s payoff with no supervisor is:

\[
\Pi^{NS}_p = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 2 - \left( \frac{2}{2} \right)^2 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{4}{11+3k} \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{2}{7} \right)^2 \right)
\]

The principal’s payoff with a supervisor is:

\[
\Pi^S_p = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 2 - \left( \frac{2}{2} \right)^2 \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{4}{11+3k} - \left( \frac{4}{11+3k} \right)^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{4}{11+3k} \right)^2 \right) + \frac{k}{2} \left( \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{4}{11+3k} \right)^2 \right) \right] - z
\]

The condition for \( \Pi^{NS}_p \leq \Pi^S_p \) is obtained from the simple calculation:

\[
\frac{1}{14} \leq \frac{1}{11+3k} - z \quad (**) \text{.}
\]

If we draw a figure, which represents the region of \((k,z)\) satisfying this condition, its shape resembles the former one.
3. Generalization: Principal-Agent Hidden Information Model with a Continuum of Types

3.1. Setting

We consider two players: a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal owns the firm and hires the manager (agent) to run it. \( \theta \) is the manager’s ability to run the firm and \( C(X, \theta) \) is the effort cost for the manager of type \( \theta \) to attain the output \( X \). For each \( \theta \), \( C(X, \theta) \) satisfies
\[
C(X, \theta) > 0, \frac{\partial C(X, \theta)}{\partial X} > 0, \frac{\partial^2 C(X, \theta)}{\partial X^2} > 0, \forall X \in \mathbb{R}_+. \]
\( W \) is the wage payment the agent receives, and so his utility is \( W - C(X, \theta) \). We normalize the agent’s reservation utility as 0. The timing of the game is as follows. Prior to contracting, \( \theta \) is determined randomly by nature and is known only to the manager (agent). The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the manager. The contract is written as \( W(X) \), where \( X \) is the output level by the manager and \( W \) is the wage he receives if he generates \( X \). If the manager accepts the offer, a contract is signed and the principal is fully committed. If he rejects the offer, the game ends.

3.2 Preliminary: Single Crossing Property (SCP) and Monotonicity of Agent’s Choice

Faced with a wage scheme \( W(X) \), the agent of type \( \theta \) will choose
\[
X \in \arg \max_{X \in \mathbb{R}} \left[ W(X) - C(X, \theta) \right]
\]
Analysis is dramatically simplified when the Agent’s types can be ordered so that higher types choose a higher output when faced with any wage. We identify when solutions to the parameterized maximization program \( \max_{X \in \mathbb{R}} U(X, \theta) := W(X) - C(X, \theta) \) are strictly increasing in the parameter \( \theta \). A key property to ensure monotone comparative statics is the following:

**Definition 1** A function \( U : X \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) where \( X, \Theta \subset \mathbb{R} \) has the **Single Crossing Property (SCP)** if \( U_X(X, \theta) \) exists and is strictly increasing in \( \theta \in \Theta \).
$U(X, \theta) = W(X) - C(X, \theta)$ has SCP if $U_x(X, \theta) = W_x(X) - C_x(X, \theta)$ exists and is strictly increasing in $\theta \in \Theta$ for all $X \in X$. In this case, $U(X, \theta)$ satisfies SCP when the marginal cost of output $C_x(X, \theta)$ is decreasing in type $\theta$, i.e., higher types always have gentler indifference curves. SCP implies that large increases in $X$ are less costly for higher parameters $\theta$.

**Theorem 1** (Edlin and Shannon)

Let $\theta^* > \theta'$, $X' \in \text{arg max } U(X, \theta')$, and $X'' \in \text{arg max } U(X, \theta^*)$. Then, if $U$ has SCP, and either $X'$ or $X''$ is in the interior of $X$, then $X'' > X'$.

**Proof** See, Appendix 1

We can apply Theorem 1 to the agent’s choice when facing a wage scheme $W(\cdot)$, assuming that the agent’s cost $C(X, \theta)$ satisfies SCP. To ensure full separation of types, we need to assume that the wage $W(\cdot)$ is differentiable. Then, $U(X, \theta)$ will satisfy SCP, and Theorem 1 implies that interior output choices are strictly increasing in types, i.e., we have *full separation*.

### 3.3 The Full information Benchmark

As a benchmark, we consider the case in which the Principal observes the Agent’s type $\theta$. Given $\theta$, she offers the bundle $(X, W)$ to solve:

$$\max_{(X, W) \in X \times \mathbb{R}} X - W(X)$$

s.t. $W(X) - C(X, \theta) \geq 0$ (IR)

(IR) is the Agent’s Individual Rationality constraint, and (IR) binds at a solution. Hence, the Principal eventually solves:

$$\max_{X \in X} X - C(X, \theta)$$
This is exactly the Total Surplus maximization. Let $X^{FB}(\theta)$ denote a solution, which we call the First Best (FB) solution. Using Theorem 1, we check whether our assumptions ensure that $X^{FB}(\theta)$ is strictly increasing in type $\theta$. If $C(X, \theta)$ satisfies SCP, which implies that Total Surplus $X - C(X, \theta)$ satisfies SCP, and if $X^{FB}(\theta)$ is in the interior for each $\theta$, we can conclude that $X^{FB}(\theta)$ is strictly increasing in $\theta$.

Now we consider a different contract from the contract $W: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ which we have considered so far, where the agent is asked to announce his type $\hat{\theta}$, and receives payment $\hat{W}(\theta)$ in exchange for an output $X(\hat{\theta})$ on the basis of his announcement $\hat{\theta}$. This is called a Direct Revelation Contract. According to the Revelation Principle, any contract $W: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ can be replaced with a Direct Revelation Contract that has an equilibrium in which all types receive the same bundles as in the original contract $W: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.

3.4 Solution with a Continuum of Types

Let the type space be continuous: $\Theta = \left[ a, b \right]$, with the cumulative distribution function $F(\cdot)$, and with a strictly positive density $f(\theta) = F'(\theta)$. In addition to previous assumptions, we assume that $C(X, \theta)$ is continuously differentiable in $\theta$ for all $X$, and $C_\theta(X, \theta)$ is bounded uniformly across $(X, \theta)$. The principal’s problem is:

$$\max \int_{\left[x(\cdot),\hat{w}(\cdot)\right]} \left[ X(\theta) - W(\theta) \right] f(\theta) d\theta$$

s.t. $W(\theta) - C(x(\theta), \theta) \geq W(\hat{\theta}) - C(x(\hat{\theta}), \theta)$ (IC$_{\theta}$) $\forall \theta, \hat{\theta} \in \Theta$

$W(\theta) - C(x(\theta), \theta) \geq 0$ (IR$_{\theta}$) $\forall \theta \in \Theta$

Just as in the two-type case, out of all the participation constraints, only the lowest type’s IR binds.
**Lemma** At a solution \((X(\cdot), W(\cdot))\), all \(IR_{\theta}\) with \(\theta > \underline{\theta}\) are not binding, \(IR_{\underline{\theta}}\) is binding.

As for the analysis of ICs with a continuum of types, a major breakthrough was achieved by Mirrlees (1971), who suggested a way to reduce the incentive constraints to a much smaller number by replacing them with the corresponding First-Order Conditions. The argument is as follows. \((IC)\) can be written as \(\theta \in \text{arg} \max_{\theta \in \Theta} U(\hat{\theta}, \theta)\), where \(U(\hat{\theta}, \theta) = W(\hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta)\) is the utility that the agent of type \(\theta\) receives by announcing that his type is \(\hat{\theta}\). If \(\theta \in (\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta})\) and \(U(\hat{\theta}, \theta)\) is differentiable in \(\hat{\theta}\), then the first order condition \(\partial U(\hat{\theta}, \theta) / \partial \hat{\theta} \bigg|_{\hat{\theta}=\theta} = 0\) is necessary for the above optimality. We define the Agent’s equilibrium utility (the value):

\(U(\theta) = U(\theta, \theta) = W(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta)\)

Note that this utility depends on \(\theta\) in two ways – through the agent’s true type and through his announcement. Differentiating with respect to \(\theta\), we have \(U'(\theta) = U'_\theta(\theta, \theta) + U_\theta(\theta, \theta)\), where the first derivative of \(U\) is with respect to the agent’s announcement (the first argument) and the second derivative is with respect to the agent’s true type (the second argument). Since the first derivative equals zero by \(\partial U(\hat{\theta}, \theta) / \partial \hat{\theta} \bigg|_{\hat{\theta}=\theta} = 0\), we have \(U'(\theta) = U'_\theta(\theta, \theta)\). This condition is nothing but the well known Envelope Theorem: the full derivative of the value of the agent’s maximization problem with respect to the parameter – his type – equals to the partial derivative holding the agent’s optimal announcement fixed. More concretely,

\[
\frac{dU(\hat{\theta}, \theta)}{d\theta} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{\theta}} \left[ W(\hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta) \right] \times \frac{d\hat{\theta}}{d\theta} + \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \left[ -C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta) \right]
\]

Since \(\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{\theta}} \left[ W(\hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta) \right] / \partial \hat{\theta} = 0\) at \(\hat{\theta} = \theta\) (the agent’s optimal announcement is Truth Telling), we have the envelope condition:

\(U'(\theta) = \frac{dU(\theta, \theta)}{d\theta} = -\frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}\).

By integrating it, we have the important formula:

\(U(\theta) = U(\theta) - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau\)  \hspace{1cm} (ICFOC)
(ICFOC) demonstrates that with a continuum of types, incentive compatibility constraints pin down up to a constant plus all types’ utilities for a given output rule $X(\cdot)$. This remarkable result is derived from the generalized Envelope Theorem by Milgrom and Segal (2002), and does not hold for the two-type (more generally the finite type) case.

Intuitively, (ICFOC) incorporates local incentive constraints, ensuring that the Agent does not gain by slightly misrepresenting $\theta$. By itself, it does not ensure that the Agent cannot gain by misrepresenting $\theta$ by a large amount. For example, (ICFOC) is consistent with the truthful announcement $\hat{\theta} = \theta$ being a local maximum, but not a global one. It is even consistent with truthful announcement being a local minimum.

Fortunately, these situations can be ruled out. For this purpose, recall that by SCP, Topkis (1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998) establish that the agent’s output choices from any tariff (and therefore in any incentive compatible contract) are nondecreasing in type. Thus, any piecewise differentiable IC contract must satisfy $X(\cdot)$ is nondecreasing (M).

It turns out that under SCP, ICFOC in conjunction with (M) do ensure that truth-telling is a global maximum, i.e., all ICs are satisfied:

**Lemma 2** $\left( X(\cdot), W(\cdot) \right)$ is Incentive Compatible if and only if both (ICFOC) and (M) hold.

where $U(\theta) = W(\theta) - C\left(X(\theta), \theta \right)$. In summary,

"Incentive Constraints $\iff$ First Order Condition (ICFOC) + Monotonicity (M)"

**Proof** See, Appendix 2

Given (ICFOC), it is convenient to use $U(\theta) = W(\theta) - C\left(X(\theta), \theta \right)$ to express transfers from agent’s utilities:

$$
W(\theta) = C\left(X(\theta), \theta \right) + U(\theta)
$$

---

2 See “3.1 Mechanism Design” of “3.Applications” in their paper, which uses the integral condition (ICFOC) as a generalization of the first-order condition to mechanisms that are not necessarily differentiable.
3.5 Collusion and Supervision

3.5.1 Introduction of a Supervisor and the Collusion-proof Problem

Now, we introduce a supervisor into the model. The principal can have access, at a cost $z$, to a supervisor who can, for each $\theta$, provide a proof of this fact with probability $p$, and with $1-p$, is unable to obtain any information. We assume that proofs of $\theta$ cannot be falsified. In other words, $\theta$ is hard information.\(^3\) On the other hand, the agent can potentially benefit from a failure by the supervisor to truthfully report that his type is $\theta$ when the supervisor observed the signal $\hat{\theta}$. A self-interested supervisor colludes with the agent only if he benefits from such behavior. We assume the following collusion technology: if the agent offers the supervisor a transfer (side payment) $t$, he benefits up to $kt$, where $k \in [0,1]$. The idea is that transfers of this sort may be hard to organize and subject to resource losses. We follow the literature in assuming that side-contracts of this sort are enforceable (See, e.g., Tirole 1992).

To avoid collusion, the principal will have to offer the supervisor a reward $W_s(\theta)$ for providing $\theta$, such that the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.

$$W_s(\theta) \geq kU(\theta) = k \left[ U(\theta) - \int_\theta^\rho \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \right]$$

Indeed, once the information $\theta$ is obtained, the principal will reduce the Agent $\theta$’s payment $W(\theta)$ to effort cost $C(X(\theta), \theta)$, and not pay the information rent $U(\theta)$ to the agent $\theta$. The agent is thus ready to pay the supervisor an amount of $U(\theta)$, and the value of this side payment to the supervisor is $kU(\theta)$, where $k \in [0,1]$. Therefore, hiring a supervisor and eliciting his information requires the principal to pay $W_s(\theta) = kU(\theta), \forall \theta$ to the supervisor if the (hard) information of $\theta$ is provided. Substituting $W_s(\theta) = kU(\theta)$ into the Principal’s objective function, the virtual surplus for type $\theta$ in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is,

\(^3\) For hard vs. soft information, see, e.g., Tirole (1992). Simply speaking, hard information is verifiable with some physical evidence, but can also be concealed. Nonetheless, it cannot be falsified.
Hence, the program of designing the optimal collusion-proof contract can be rewritten as

\[
\max_{X(\theta), U(\theta)} \left[ X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) - [(1 - p) + pk] U(\theta) \right] f(\theta) d\theta - z
\]

s.t. \[ \frac{dX(\theta)}{d\theta} \geq 0 : X(\theta) \text{ is nondecreasing} \quad \text{(M)} \]

\[ U(\theta) = U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{p} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \quad \text{(ICFOC)} \]

\[ U(\theta) = W(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) \geq u(\text{Const.}) \quad \text{(IR)} \]

Note that the objective function takes the familiar form of the expected difference between total surplus and the Agent’s information rent.

3.5.2 Solving the Relaxed Problem

Thus, the problem can be rewritten as

\[
\max_{X(\theta), U(\theta)} \left[ X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) - [(1 - p) + pk] U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{p} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \right] f(\theta) d\theta - z
\]

s.t. \[ \frac{dX(\theta)}{d\theta} \geq 0 \quad \text{(M)} \quad \forall \theta \]

where \[ \int_{\theta}^{p} \left[ U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{p} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \right] f(\theta) d\theta \] can be called the expected information rents.

Lemma3:

\[
\int_{\theta}^{p} \left[ U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{p} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \right] f(\theta) d\theta = U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{p} \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} f(\theta) d\theta
\]

Proof See, Appendix 3

Substituting these expected information rents into the principal’s program, and ignoring the constant
$U(\theta)$, the program becomes

$$\max_{X(\cdot)} \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta} \left[ X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) + \left[ (1 - p) + pk \right] \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \right] f(\theta) d\theta - z$$

s.t. $\frac{dX(\theta)}{d\theta} \geq 0 \quad (M) \ \forall \theta$

We ignore the Monotonicity Constraint (M) and solve the resulting relaxed program. Thus, the principal maximize the expected value of the expression within the square brackets, which is called the virtual surplus, and denoted by $J(X, \theta)$. This expected value is maximized by simultaneously maximizing virtual surplus for (almost) every type $\theta$, i.e.,

$$X^S(\theta) \in \arg \max_{X(\cdot)} X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) + \left[ (1 - p) + pk \right] \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}$$

This defines the optimal output rule $X^S(\cdot)$ for the relaxed program. The principal’s choice of $X^S(\theta)$ can be understood as a trade-off between maximizing the total surplus for type $\theta$ and reducing the information rents of all types above $\theta$, just as in the two-type case. Indeed, (ICFOC) says that output choice $X$ for type $\theta$ results in additional information rent $-\frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}$ for all types above $\theta$.

In particular, for the highest type $\tilde{\theta}$, there are no higher types, i.e., $F(\tilde{\theta}) = 1$, and the principal just maximizes total surplus, choosing $X^S(\tilde{\theta}) = X^{FB}(\tilde{\theta})$. In words, we have efficiency at the top.

For all other types, the principal will distort output to reduce information rents. To see the direction of distortion, consider the parameterized maximization program

$$\max_{X(\cdot)} \Psi(X, \gamma) = X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) + \gamma \left[ \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \right] \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}$$

Here $\gamma = 0$ corresponds to surplus-maximization (first-best), and $\gamma = 1\{p = 0, k \in [0, 1]\}$ corresponds to the principal’s (relaxed) second best program with only one agent.
Note that
\[ \frac{\partial \Psi(X, \gamma)}{\partial X \partial \gamma} = \left[ \frac{1-F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \right] \frac{\partial^2 C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta} < 0 \text{ for } \theta < \bar{\theta} \]

since the agent’s value \( U(X, \theta) = W(X) - C(X, \theta) \) has the single crossing property (SCP), that is,
\[ \frac{\partial^2 U(X, \theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta} = - \frac{\partial^2 C(X, \theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta} > 0. \]

Therefore, \( \Psi(X, \gamma) \) has SCP in \((X, -\gamma)\), and by Theorem 1 (Edlin and Shannon), we have \( X^*(\gamma = 1) \Leftrightarrow X(\theta) < X^{FB}(\theta) \Leftrightarrow X^*(\gamma = 0) \) for all \( \theta < \bar{\theta} \). In words, the principal makes all types other than the highest type underproduce in order to reduce the information rents of types above them. Similarly, by introducing the supervisor, which basically corresponds to \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \), we have
\[ X^*(\gamma = 1) \Leftrightarrow X(\theta) < X^*(\gamma \in (0,1)) \Leftrightarrow X^S(\theta) \leq X^*(\gamma = 0) \Leftrightarrow X^{FB}(\theta). \]

Hence, in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the principal can induce more marginal incentives than the second best regime with only one agent through the reduction in total and marginal information rents paid to the supervisor and the agent \( \theta \), in other words, reducing the implementation costs for any \( X < X^S(\bar{\theta}) = X^{FB}(\bar{\theta}) \). This result is a generalization of the two-type case. Thus, we obtain the following proposition.

**Proposition 3:**

In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime with a continuum of types, the optimal collusion-proof contract has the property that

1. **Efficiency at the top** (the highest type \( \bar{\theta} \)) \( X(\bar{\theta}) = X^{FB}(\bar{\theta}) \)
2. **Downward distortion** for all other types \( \theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \) is mitigated, that is,
\[ X(\theta) \leq X^S(\theta) \leq X^{FB}(\theta). \]

Now, remember that we ignored the monotonicity constraint (M) and solved the relaxed program.

So, we need to check that the solution \( X^S(\theta) \) indeed satisfies the monotonicity constraint (M), that
is, the output rule \( X^S(\theta) \) is nondecreasing. We can check it using Theorem 1. To simplify expressions, define \( h(\theta) \equiv f(\theta)/[1 - F(\theta)] > 0 \), which is called the hazard rate of type \( \theta \).

Then, the principal’s program can be rewritten as

\[
\max_{X \in X} J(X, \theta) = X - C(X, \theta) + \frac{[(1 - p) + pk]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial C(X, \theta)}{\partial \theta}
\]

By Topkis (1978) and Theorem 1, assuming that \( C(X, \theta) \) is sufficiently smooth, a sufficient condition for \( X^S(\theta) \) to be nondecreasing in \( \theta \) is for the following derivative to be strictly increasing in \( \theta \):

\[
\frac{\partial J(X, \theta)}{\partial X} = 1 - \frac{\partial C(X, \theta)}{\partial X} + \frac{[(1 - p) + pk]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 C(X, \theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta}
\]  

(\*)

Since \(-C(X, \theta)\) satisfies SCP, the second term is strictly increasing in \( \theta \), and the first term does not depend on \( \theta \). The only problematic term, therefore, is the third term. Our result is ensured when the third term is nondecreasing in \( \theta \). Since \( 1/h(\theta) \) is positive and \( \partial^2 C(X, \theta)/\partial X \partial \theta \) is negative, this is ensured when \( \partial^2 C(X, \theta)/\partial X \partial \theta \) is nondecreasing. That is, we have

**Proposition 4:**

A sufficiency condition for the optimal collusion-proof solution \( X^S(\theta) \) to satisfy the monotonicity constraint (M) is that the following conditions hold.

1. \( \partial^2 C(X, \theta)/\partial X \partial \theta \) is nondecreasing in \( \theta \).

2. The hazard rate \( h(\theta) \) is nondecreasing.

**Example:** The first assumption is satisfied e.g., in the following cost function forms:

\[
C(X, \theta) = (X - \theta)^\alpha \text{ and } C(X, \theta) = (X/\theta)^\alpha, \quad \alpha \geq 2
\]
The second condition is called the “Monotone Hazard Rate Condition” and satisfied by many familiar probability distributions. At this time, we can present the following proposition on the comparative statics.

**Proposition 5:** Suppose that the sufficiency condition in proposition 2 holds. Then, the optimal collusion-proof solution $X^S(\theta)$ is nondecreasing in the parameter $p$, and nonincreasing in the parameter $k$.

**Proof** See, Appendix 4

This result could be said to demonstrate the advantage of our approach, because the extensions of the Tirole (1986) model, such as Laffont and Tirole (1991), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Laffont and Martimort (1997), and Suzuki (1999), often have the complicated structure of a Kuhn-Tucker problem with many IC and IR constraints, and so the global characterization of the optimal solutions as well as the robust comparative statics are often difficult to obtain, and only a local characterization of the solution and comparative statics is possible in the collusion literature described above, while on the other hand, we can readily perform a robust (monotone) comparative statics, and the rationale of the results is clear and intuitive.

4. Improvement by adding another supervisor

Here, we introduce another supervisor, who is honest (not strategic), but only with a smaller probability $p' (\leq p)$ can observe the signal $\theta$. We assume for simplicity that the states which he can observe are included in the ones which the main supervisor can observe, and that it is a common knowledge. In this setting, when the main supervisor tries to tell a lie (hides the information $\theta$) collusively, the sub-supervisor observes the signal $\theta$ with probability $p'$, and reports it to the principal at no incentive cost, since he is honest (not strategic). Then, the main supervisor can not obtain any positive information rent. Thus, the expected gain for the main supervisor when he observes the signal $\theta$ will be reduced to $(p - p') k U(\theta)$. Bringing an additional supervisor can help, even if it costs $z'$, provided he is honest: the sub-supervisor can work as a checking device for

---

4 Of course, in general, neither assumption needs to be satisfied, in which case, the monotonicity condition (M) binds. As for this case, see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)’s Contract Theory book (Chapter 2) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)’s Game Theory book (Chapter 7).
collusion and reduce the information rent of the main-supervisor. Due to the reduction of expected information rent, the marginal incentive of the agent will also be increased in equilibrium.

Let us formally check this argument. The principal maximizes the virtual surplus $J(X, \theta)$,

$$\max_{X \in X} J(X, \theta) = X(\theta) - C(X(\theta), \theta) + \frac{[(1-p)+(p-p')k]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial C(X, \theta)}{\partial \theta}$$

The first order condition for the optimum is,

$$\frac{\partial J(X, \theta)}{\partial X} = 1 - \frac{\partial C(X, \theta)}{\partial X} + \frac{[(1-p)+(p-p')k]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 C(X, \theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta} = 0$$

Since $(1-p)+(p-p')k \leq (1-p)+pk, \forall p' \in [0, p]$, we have the following proposition on the comparison of equilibrium incentives.

**Proposition 6:**

Supposing that $X^{ST}(\theta)$ is the solution of this regime, we obtain:

$$X(\theta) \leq X^S(\theta) \leq X^{ST}(\theta) \leq X^{FB}(\theta) \text{ for all } \theta \in \left[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}\right]$$

If the expected reduction in the information rent $p'kU(\theta)$ is greater than the resource cost $z'$ of sub-supervisor, the principal has indeed an incentive to introduce a sub-supervisor into the organization. That is, another auditor can serve as an incentive mechanism not only for the main-auditor (main-supervisor) but also for management (agent). This simple argument gives a rationale for the auditing system consisting of the main- and sub-supervisors (auditors) in corporate governance reform.

5. No Commitment/Renegotiation Problem

So far, we have considered a situation where the principal can commit to the collusion-proof contract. Here, we examine more explicitly the timing of the game. The principal has access to the supervisor, who chooses a message $m \in \{\emptyset, \theta\}$, where $\emptyset$ means that he did not obtain any information. If the principal receives the message from the supervisor that the type information is $\theta$, the principal
will have an incentive to renegotiate the original contract. The principal can raise her payoff by eliminating the downward distortions in all other types than the highest one $\bar{\theta}$. Namely, instead of $\{X(\theta), W(\theta)\}$, she will offer the efficient (first best) contract $\{X^{FB}(\theta), W^{FB}(\theta)\}$, and the information rent $U(\theta)$ will be exploited by the principal. If the agent of type $\theta$ anticipates this modification, since he can benefit from a failure by the supervisor to report his type $\theta$ truthfully, he will offer the supervisor the transfer (side payment)$U(\theta)$, which the supervisor benefits up to $kt$, where $k \in [0,1]$. Thus, the principal must pay $W_s(\theta)=kU(\theta)$ to the supervisor in opposition to the collusive offer by the agent, in order to elicit the true information. In summary, the principal strictly improves his payoff by changing $X(\theta)$ into $X^{FB}(\theta)$ ex post, but the ex ante inefficiency $-kU(\theta)$ arises. This is the trade-off in this no commitment/renegotiation problem.\(^5\)

The virtual surplus for type $\theta$ in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is written as

\[
(1-p)[X(\theta)-C(X(\theta),\theta)] + p \cdot \frac{X^{FB}(\theta)-C(X^{FB}(\theta),\theta)}{\text{(Ex post) First Best Allocative Efficiency}} - [(1-p)+pk]U(\theta)
\]

Eventually, in this regime, the principal maximizes the virtual surplus $J(X,\theta)$,

\[
\max_{X \in X} J(X,\theta) = (1-p)[X(\theta)-C(X(\theta),\theta)] + \frac{[(1-p)+pk]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial C(X,\theta)}{\partial \theta}
\]

The first order condition for the optimum is,

\[
\frac{\partial J(X,\theta)}{\partial X} = (1-p)\left[1-\frac{\partial C(X,\theta)}{\partial X}\right] + \frac{[(1-p)+pk]}{h(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 C(X,\theta)}{\partial X \partial \theta} = 0
\]

We now have the following proposition on the comparison of equilibrium incentives.

\(^5\)This idea is close to the renegotiation problem from lack of commitment to the long term contract, which was first considered by Dewatripont (1988)
**Proposition 7:**

Supposing that $X^R(\theta)$ is the solution (in the no-information phase $\emptyset$) of this regime, we obtain:

$$X^R(\theta) \leq X(\theta) \leq X^S(\theta) \leq X^{SR}(\theta) \leq X^{FR}(\theta) \quad \text{for all} \quad \theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$$

The first inequality arises from the fact that the principal designs the optimal contract of the no-information phase $\emptyset$ taking the ex ante inefficiency $-pkU(\theta)$ into consideration. That is, the principal tries to optimally reduce the agent’s information rent $U(\theta) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial C(X^R(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} d\theta$, in order to mitigate the collusive pressure by the agent when the supervisor observed the signal $\theta$.

6. Conclusion

Recently, auditing to meet the needs of corporate governance has rapidly been increasing in importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S. and Western countries. Given this trend, we were motivated to build a theoretical model to examine how supervision (auditing) could be utilized in order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance and to deter collusive supervision (auditing). We started with an extremely simple three-tier collusion model (in section2), which is a natural extension of the familiar screening (self selection) models, and then generalized its investigation to a continuum of types version (in and after section3). We introduced the outcomes of “Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis (1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)’s generalized envelope theorem into a familiar screening (self selection) model with a continuum of types, and constructed a three-tier agency model with a mathematically tractable structure. This should be an advantage in modeling in comparison with the collusion literature e.g., Kofman and Lawarree (1993)’s auditing application of the three-tier agency model à la Tirole (1986, 1992). The basic trade-off involved in adding the auditor (supervisor) into the hierarchy is the benefit obtained by the discrete reduction in information rent and the improvement of marginal incentives (outputs) versus the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor). This bottom line was consistently preserved through the model.

It should be noted that throughout the paper we have used the revelation principle, solving programs in which the principal always prevents collusion between the auditor (supervisor) and the manager (agent). In the optimal contract, nobody colludes: this is called the collusion-proof principle. However, this does not imply an obvious inconsistency with reality, where collusive supervision (auditing) often makes headlines, as stated in the introduction. The revelation principle and the
collusion-proof principle are a solution technique which facilitates characterization of the optimal contract. Indeed, if we consider an incomplete grand contract situation like Tirole (1992), Laffont and Tirole (1991), and Suzuki (1999), equilibrium collusion can improve efficiency. Such models indeed could be usefully applied, in such fields as political economy, regulation, and authority delegation in organizations. We also showed as an application what happens when the principal cannot commit to the mechanism and the renegotiation is unavoidable. In summary, we can say that the contribution of our paper is to apply the monotone comparative statics method to the three-tier agency model with hidden information and collusion, to provide a framework that can address the issues treated in the existing literature in a much simpler fashion, and to derive some clear and robust implication applicable to corporate governance reform.
Appendix 1 Proof of Theorem 1

Suppose for definiteness that $X'$ is in the interior of $X$. Then, the following first-order condition must hold: $U_x(X', \theta') = 0$. But then by SCP, $U_x(X', \theta'') > U_x(X', \theta') = 0$, and therefore $X'$ cannot be optimal for parameter value $\theta''$ - a small increase in $X$ would increase $U$. Therefore, $X'' \neq X'$. It will yield the result $X'' > X'$.

Q.E.D

Appendix 2 Proof of Lemma 2

Proof The “⇒” part was established above. It remains to show that local IC and monotonicity imply that $U(\hat{\theta}, \theta) \leq U(\theta)$ for all $\hat{\theta}, \theta$. For $\hat{\theta} > \theta$, we can write

$$U(\hat{\theta}, \theta) - U(\theta) = W(\hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta) - U(\theta)$$

$$= U(\hat{\theta}) + C(X(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta) - U(\theta)$$

$$= [C(X(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}) - C(X(\hat{\theta}), \theta)] + [U(\hat{\theta}) - U(\theta)]$$

$$= \int_0^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\partial C(X(\hat{\theta}), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau + \int_0^\theta \left[ -\frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} \right] d\tau$$

$$= \int_0^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\partial C(X(\hat{\theta}), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau - \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \leq 0$$

Here the last equality obtains by (ICFOC)$^6$, and the inequality obtains by SCP and the fact that $X(\hat{\theta}) \geq X(\tau)$ by (M). The proof for $\theta > \hat{\theta}$ is similar.

Q.E.D

Appendix 3 Proof of Lemma 3

Proof:

$$U(\hat{\theta}) - U(\theta) = \int_0^{\theta} dU(\tau) d\tau \quad \Rightarrow \quad \int_0^\theta \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau = -\int_0^\theta \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau$$

\[\text{Envelope Theorem}\]
We transform the expected information rents by exploiting “Integration by Parts”.

Now, remember that

\[
\int_{\theta}^{\sigma} \left[ U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{\sigma} \frac{\partial C(X(\tau), \tau)}{\partial \tau} d\tau \right] f(\theta) d\theta = \int_{\theta}^{\sigma} U(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta
\]

Because

\[
\left[ U(\theta) F(\theta) \right]' = U(\theta) f(\theta) + \frac{dU(\theta)}{d\theta} F(\theta) = U(\theta) f(\theta) - \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} F(\theta),
\]

and so

\[
\int_{\theta}^{\sigma} U(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta = \left[ U(\theta) F(\theta) \right]' + \int_{\theta}^{\sigma} \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} F(\theta) d\theta
\]

and so

\[
\int_{\theta}^{\sigma} U(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta = U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{\sigma} \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} F(\theta) d\theta
\]

\[
\therefore U(\theta) = U(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{\sigma} \frac{\partial C(X(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} (1 - F(\theta)) d\theta
\]

Q.E.D

Appendix 4 Proof of Proposition 3

Proof: From the equation (*), the derivative \( J_X(X, \theta) \) is nondecreasing in the parameter \( p \), because the derivative of \( J_X(X, \theta) \) in the parameter \( p \) is \( -1 + k \leq 0 \) for \( k \in [0,1] \). Hence, from the theorem 1, the optimal solution \( X^*(\theta) \) is nondecreasing in the parameter \( p \). Particularly, \( X^*(\theta) \) is strictly increasing in \( p \) for \( k \in [0,1] \) from theorem 1. The latter part can also be proved in the same way: The derivative \( J_X(X, \theta) \) is nonincreasing in the parameter.


\( k \) for \( p \in [0,1] \), and thus the optimal solution \( X^S(\theta) \) is nonincreasing in the parameter \( k \).

\textbf{Q.E.D}

\textbf{REFERENCES}


Milgrom, P and Roberts, J (1990) “Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities” \textit{Econometrica} 58 1255-1278


付録1. 情報経済論　配布資料

コーポレートガバナンス（企業統治）と自己選抜モデル
2006年12月6日（水）　鈴木　豊

（準備）
1. エージェンシー関係　株主-経営者　契約の束（Nexus of contracts）
2. 「コーポレートガバナンス」の定義：企業経営者に対する規律付け　ほか
3. トップマネジメント組織　株主総会（P）－取締役会（A）－監査役（S）

（問題）
株主（プリンシパル）、経営者（エージェント）からなるゲームを考える。株主（大株主）は企業を所有し、経営者を労働市場から雇い入れる。その時、経営者によって、企業利潤$\pi = \theta + e$が生み出される。ここで、$\theta$は経営者の経営能力（タイプ）で0か1のいずれかであり、$e$は経営者の経営努力であるとする。努力$e$を支出する時のコストを$\psi(e) = e^2/4$とするとき、経営者の効用（利得）関数は、$W$を所得として、$W - \psi(e)$となる。また、経営者の留保利得は0であるとする。契約前に、タイプ$\theta \in \{0,1\}$はランダムに決まり、真の$\theta$は経営者のみが知る私的情報であり、株主には$\theta$が等確率で0か1のいずれかであるという情報、つまり$Pr(\theta = 0) = Pr(\theta = 1) = 1/2$ということのみがわかっているとする。この下で、プリンシパル（株主）はエージェント（経営者）に、要求する利潤$\pi$と報酬$W$からなる契約$\{\pi, W\}$を提示する。

1. プリンシパル（株主）が$\theta$を知っている時の最適解（完全情報解）を導出せよ。
2. 本文のように、プリンシパル（株主）がエージェント（経営者）のタイプ$\theta$を知らないケースを考える。この時の最適（分離）契約（各タイプ用の2種類の契約を提示する時の最適解）が満たすべき重要な条件を二つ示し、その意味を明かにせよ。
3. その問題を解き、最適解を導出せよ。能力の高い経営者と、能力の低い経営者でいずれがファーストベストの経営努力を行うか？いずれがスラック（Slack）するか？また、最適解がなぜそのような形を取るか、理論的な直観を述べよ（図示でも良い）。
4. 3の最適解の状況を仮定する。今、株主が、第3者（監査役・会計士(Auditor)等）を使って、経営者のタイプ$\theta$を調査し、$\theta = 1$であるという（証拠を伴う）情報を提供した場合には、$W_1 = 1/8$の報酬を加えるという契約を彼と結んだ。このとき、いかなる問題が生じるか、次の用語を使いながら数値を交えて指摘せよ。用語：情報レント、結託(collusion)
付錄2．情報経済論 2006年度 後期試験問題 3番

コーポレートガバナンス（企業統治）と自己選抜モデル

3．株主（プリンシパル）と経営者（エージェント）を考える。株主は企業を所有し、企業の経営者を労働市場から雇い入れる。その時、経営者によって、企業利潤 $\pi = \theta e$ が生み出される。ここで、$\theta$ は経営者の経営能力（タイプ）で1か2のいずれかであり、$e$ は経営者の経営努力であるとする。努力 $e$ を支出する時のコストを $\psi(e) = e^2/4$ とするとき、経営者の効用（利得）関数は、$W$ を所得として、$W - \psi(e)$ となる。また、経営者の留保利得は0であるとする。契約前にタイプ $\theta \in \{1, 2\}$ はランダムに決まり、真の $\theta$ は経営者のみが知る私的情報であり、株主には $\theta$ が等確率で1か2のいずれかであるという情報、つまり $\Pr(\theta = 1) = \Pr(\theta = 2) = 1/2$ ということのみが分かるとする。この下で、プリンシパル（株主）はエージェント（経営者）に、要求する利潤 $\pi$ と報酬 $W$ からなる契約 $\{\pi, W\}$ を提示する。

（1）プリンシパル（株主）が $\theta$ を知っている時の最適解（完全情報解）を導出せよ。
（2）本文のように、プリンシパル（株主）がエージェント（経営者）のタイプ $\theta$ を知らないケースを考える。この時の最適（分離）契約（各タイプ用の2種類の契約を提示する時の最適解）が満たすべき重要な条件を二つ示し、その意味を明らかにせよ。
（3）その問題を解き、最適解を導出し、その特徴づけをせよ。さらに、最適解がなぜそのような形を取るかについての理論的な直観を述べて（図示でも良い）。
（4）（3）の最適解の状況を考える。今、株主が、第3者（監査役（会））を設置して、経営者のタイプ $\theta$ を調査し、$\theta = 2$ であるという（証拠を伴う）情報を提供した場合に、$W_2 = 2$ の報酬をやるという監査契約を結んだ。その際、いかなる問題が生じるか。次の用語を使い、数値を具体的に入れながら説明せよ。用語：情報レント、馴れ合い監査、日本型ガバナンス、監査役設置会社。

（注）授業では企業利潤が $\pi = \theta + e$ （加法型）のケースを解いたが、ここでは、企業利潤は $\pi = \theta e$ （乗法型）であることに注意しながら解答せよ。

（注）「本付録2問とその解答」が、論文2節のMotivational Examplesに書かれている。