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このアイテムの引用には次の識別子を使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/12696

タイトル: Undertaking nonharmful or harmful public projects through unit-by-unit contribution : Coordination and Pareto efficiency
著者: Shinohara, Ryusuke
キーワード: Public project
unit-by-unit contribution
Pareto effiency
strong Nash equilibria
coalition-proof Nash equilibria
発行日: 2016-9-5
出版者: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
シリーズ番号/レポート番号: 政治経済学的要因を考慮に入れた経済政策分析と経済制度設計 : 理論と実証;3
抄録: We examine in detail the implementation of a project that is nonharmful for all agents as well as a project that is harmful for some agents through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. For a project that is nonharmful for all agents, effient implementation is supported at one regular Nash equilibrium and several refined Nash equilibria that are stable against coalition deviations. In this sense, this mechanism works well. On the other hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, this mechanism may not have a Nash equilibrium with effient implementation of the project. Even when such a Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be selected by any of the refned Nash equilibria. Thus, in this case, this mechanism does not work. Our result shows that the merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature is partially extensible to the implementation of a public project.
記述: 巻末に付録ⅰ-ⅱ有
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/12696
出現コレクション:比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー(ICES Working Paper)


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