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このアイテムの引用には次の識別子を使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/13682

タイトル: “An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance” : Commitment vs. Flexibility
著者: Suzuki, Yutaka
Tsuranuki, Yoshihiro
キーワード: Eurozone fiscal governance
incomplete contract
発行日: 2017-1-24
出版者: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
シリーズ番号/レポート番号: 欧州連合における集権・分権と状態依存ガバナンスのゲーム理論的分析およびその拡張;2
抄録: In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/13682
出現コレクション:比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー:ICES Working Paper


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