法政大学学術機関リポジトリ >
030 紀要 >
Journal of International Economic Studies >

このアイテムの引用には次の識別子を使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/229

タイトル: Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard
著者: Suzuki, Yutaka
キーワード: Bilateral Moral Hazard
Team Production
Commitment Problem
Linear Contracts
Relational Contracts
Reputation and Self Enforcement
Corporate Governance
発行日: 2007-3
出版者: The Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
抄録: In a bilateral moral hazard framework, where the principal is also a productive agent, the requirements of both the agent’s and the principal's incentive provisions should be satisfied in designing optimal incentive contracts. In a static framework, only the second best is obtainable if the incentive contract is based only on the total output. One example of this is the simple linear sharing rule that is often observed. Next, it is shown that in a repeated game version, such a commitment problem could be solved, and a first best outcome could be achieved through both parties taking trigger strategies that depend on a public signal. We give an interpretation in the viewpoint of the 'reputation' mechanism, and a qualitative characterization on the optimal solution induced in equilibrium for all possible discount factors. Finally, some applications for corporate governance are presented.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/229
ISSN: 09111247
出現コレクション:Journal of International Economic Studies


ファイル 記述 サイズフォーマット
21suzuki.pdf210.08 kBAdobe PDF見る/開く



Valid XHTML 1.0! DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2010  Duraspace - ご意見をお寄せください